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I. Introduction 
Privatization and the opening up of domestic markets to foreign direct investment (“FDI”) 
have been a major focus of world development organizations and especially post-socialist 
economies, but the track record of these policies as effective mechanisms for economic 
development has been mixed at best. If these policies are not always effective in creating 
economic development, when and under what conditions can privatization and FDI be used to 
foster local economic development and upgrading, and how can public actors play a more 
effective role in guiding this process? 
Privatization proponents advocate the withdrawal of the state from interference in the 
local economy by selling state-run firms to private owners and opening up the local economy to 
foreign competition and investment (Sachs & Lipton, 1990, Williamson, 1990, Bhagwati, 2004). 
These proponents of the free market argue that private firms are more dynamic, more 
competitive and more efficient than state-run firms. They also claim that opening up the local 
economy to foreign capital will bring financial and technological investment from foreign firms 
that will help local industries to upgrade and become more competitive. In this view, 
privatization and FDI will create economic growth and more competitive local industry through 
technology enhancing outcomes. 
However, widespread evidence shows that privatization is not a panacea and has not 
always created economic growth and development (Amsden, Kochanowitz, & Taylor, 1994, 
Stiglitz, 1998). Privatization and FDI have led to disinvestment in the local economy and have 
undermined rather than upgraded local industries. Often, private investors are motivated to 
acquire only the most profitable segments of a firm and choose not to invest in making the firm 
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competitive as a whole. This leads to a significant contraction of the firm’s operations, a decline 
in economic output and a loss of local jobs, exactly the opposite of what privatization and 
liberalization were intended to provide. Local industries can then wind up less competitive than 
before these policies were initiated. Critics argue that sole reliance on FDI and privatization is an 
oversimplification of a more complex dynamic. They do not deny that private firms and foreign 
investment can play a key role in economic development, nor do they contend that state-run 
economies are superior to market economies. Rather, they claim that simply removing state 
interference from the economy is not enough by itself to create economic development (Amsden, 
Kochanowitz, & Taylor, 1994, Stiglitz, 1998, Rodrik, 1999, Sabel & Reddy, 2002). 
If privatization and foreign investment can work to create economic development, but are 
not sufficient by themselves, what are the missing factors in this equation? A growing number of 
theorists argue that privatization and foreign investment need to be invoked to the extent which 
is appropriate for the local economy and deployed within a larger framework of local 
development policies guided by the public sector. Indeed, heterodox theorists such as Amsden 
argue that the government must actively seek “reciprocity” when selling state-run firms and 
inviting foreign investors by negotiating conditions with private purchasers that help ensure the 
desired benefits for the local economy from private ownership and investment (Amsden, 2001). 
In sum, public actors and development agencies must think more critically and in more specific 
detail about what benefits they expect privatization and FDI to provide to the local economy and 
establish clear policies and actions to achieve these benefits (Amsden, Kochanowitz, & Taylor, 
1994, Rodrik, 1999). 
This paper examines one such case of successful development policy where the 
instruments of privatization and FDI were used within a larger framework of development 
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policies and implemented under close guidance from public actors. The paper draws on the case 
of the Czech automotive industry which has grown impressively since the fall of communism. It 
has grown through a combination of both free market economics and government guidance. 
Through a detailed examination of the sequence of steps taken by the state and planning agencies, 
this paper will provide insights into the specific policies and processes that accompanied 
successful privatization and FDI in the Czech case to ensure local economic development and 
industrial upgrading in the economy. 
The key information about this case was gathered from interviews with development 
agency officials in the Czech Republic, local firms, and professors at the University of 
Economics in Prague. They also provided access to empirical data about the development of the 
automotive industry in the Czech Republic over the last fifteen years. The information gained 
from these individuals has been by supplemented peer-reviewed academic research and public 
news sources to create a continuous narrative of actions and events over the study period. 
The paper will first explore further the debate between the proponents and critics of 
neoliberal development policies in the academic literature before proceeding to a detailed 
analysis of the Czech automotive industry case. The section entitled “Privatization Success Story: 
Skoda Auto” begins with a brief description of the state of the Czech automotive industry at the 
outset of the privatization process. This section proceeds on to recount the actions taken by the 
government during and after the sale of the largest auto manufacturer and how they were 
important in creating a solid base for the automotive industry in the Czech Republic under the 
subheading “The Right Moves: Bidding and Sale of Skoda”. Under the next section, “Challenges 
Beyond Privatization”, the focus shifts to how the Czech automotive industry has grown and 
developed since that time and what crucial roles public actors have played in that growth and 
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development. A final summary will address the new and different role that the state and public 
agencies have played in guiding local economic development through the process of 
privatization and market liberalization in the Czech auto industry. 
II. The Privatization Debate: Themes in the Literature 
What Privatization Promises 
Privatization emerged as an important policy tool in economic development in the mid-
1980’s with the rise of the Thatcher regime in Great Britain. In an attempt to combat the 
“stagflation” that had afflicted the UK in the 1970’s, the government began a major effort to 
privatize previously state-owned firms. Sales of state-owned firms such as Cable and Wireless 
and British Rail were considered to be great successes. These sales raised funds for the 
government and produced firms which became more economically competitive than they had 
been previously. The privatization effort was regarded by the British government as a key policy 
tool in helping the country to escape stagflation (Megginson and Netter, 2001).  
The initial success of market-based reforms in the UK in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s 
gave support to the theory that greater reliance on free markets and less government intervention 
were the primary keys to economic growth and development. This positive experience of 
privatization and free market economics grew into a larger economic theory called neoliberalism. 
Neoliberalism focuses on moving away from protected markets and state ownership in favor of 
the free market and private enterprises. Privatization, open markets and FDI thus became central 
tenets of neoliberal economic theory.  
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Using the fundamentals of neoliberal theory, a specific set of policy prescriptions for 
economic development was formulated by development agencies in Washington such as the IMF 
and the World Bank. First enumerated in their entirety in John Williamson’s chapter “What 
Washington Means by Policy Reform” from his 1990 book, the neoliberal reform agenda 
acquired the title of the “Washington Consensus” (Williamson, 1990). Drawn mostly from 
successful experiences with neoliberal reform in Chile under Pinochet and the failure of other 
Latin American countries’ socialist and import-substitution policies, these recommendations 
gained currency as the new strategy of economic development in the 1980’s and often became 
tied to the aid and assistance provided by the World Bank and IMF as conditionalities. It was 
widely believed that these reforms would trigger economic growth and development, and 
through the 1990’s, many countries were persuaded to open up protected markets to foreign 
investors and privatize state-owned firms in exchange for financial assistance from the IMF and 
World Bank. 
Criticisms of Neoliberal Theory: An Incomplete Story 
Unfortunately, the Washington Consensus did not always provide the development and 
growth which it envisioned. Some countries which implemented the Washington Consensus to 
the letter suffered severe economic crises and stagnation while other countries which did not 
fully implement the Washington Consensus experienced record growth. Argentina, for example, 
was one major follower of the Washington Consensus which privatized several major industries 
only to suffer a major monetary system collapse and economic contraction in 2001. Some of the 
more successful countries, such as China, chose to apply only certain steps from the Consensus 
and not always in the manner or to the full extent prescribed by the theory or world development 
organizations. These success stories show that perhaps some of the fundamental thinking behind 
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the Consensus was sound, but was incomplete in its details and incorrect in the attempt to apply 
the recommended policies in full measure across many countries with different development 
situations (Stiglitz, 1998).  
Serious criticism has been specifically leveled at the use of neoliberal policy in Eastern 
Europe. The pursuit of free markets has been characterized as too singular and driven out of 
personal ideology rather than pragmatism. The model of capitalism adopted in many post-
socialist countries was extreme in its simplistic laissez-faire attitude, and the role of institutions 
and actors other than private actors was largely ignored. The end result was that many countries 
not only fell further behind Western Europe, but also fell below levels of income and production 
that had been present under communism (Amsden, Kochanowitz, Taylor, 1994).  
Stuck in Reverse: Neoliberal Failure in Developing Country Automotive Industries 
The automotive industry in developing countries has been a large industry often 
associated with national economic development and technological upgrading. Traditionally a 
state-owned sector, the auto industry became a major focus of neoliberal reform in the 1990’s. 
The experience of the automotive industry in developing countries with neoliberal policies has 
generally been negative. Opening up to foreign investment has had particularly negative 
consequences for some developing nations. When foreign auto manufacturers invest in 
developing country production without restrictions on sourcing components domestically, they 
frequently turn to foreign sources. As a result, the domestic industry does not become more 
competitive, but rather contracts and occupies a smaller, low value-added part of the market 
where lack of technical capacity is not as great a concern for manufacturers (Barnes and 
Kaplinsky, 2000).  
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In South Africa, the automotive industry has historically consisted of foreign 
manufacturers and domestic suppliers protected by local content restrictions (Barnes and 
Kaplinsky, 2000). In the 1990’s, the government established the Motor Industry Development 
Plan (“MIDP”) to develop a globally competitive automotive sector. The MIDP brought down 
tariffs on imported automobiles and essentially eliminated protection for the components 
industry. The effect of the MIDP was largely that foreign manufacturers increasingly substituted 
local components for foreign components. Manufacturers sought to work with global firms 
which could supply their needs worldwide because of logistical and quality requirements. From 
September 1995 to 2000, the local content of cars in South Africa dipped from 57.5% to 49.6%.  
Over the first five years of the new millennium, it was expected that the decline would continue 
down to 40%. For example, one foreign manufacturer which was not even particularly well 
integrated into the global operations of its foreign parent saw its direct imports of material rise 
from 0% in 1993 to 30% in 2003. Local content declined from 50% to 40% and effectively even 
lower when adjusting for knocked-down assembly components from the parent. Manufacturers 
were even starting to import heavy components such as metal body parts which are typically 
sourced locally due to the cost of freight (Barnes and Kaplinsky, 2000). 
Czech Success with FDI and Privatization: Central Argument 
The Czech automotive story stands in sharp contrast to these negative experiences with 
privatization and foreign investment. Since the fall of communism, the Czech government has 
directly and through its development agencies championed the cause of private ownership and 
foreign investment. The industry has not only survived, but even evolved to become a global 
competitor. As I detail in the rest of the paper, the key difference between the Czech story and 
the experience in other developing countries like South Africa is the way in which the Czech 
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government guided and monitored foreign investment. At various stages over the past fifteen 
years, the government and its development agency, CzechInvest, instituted specific policies to 
ensure that privatization and foreign investment led to spillovers in the local economy and 
industrial upgrading.  
The foundation for the development of the Czech automotive industry was laid with the 
privatization of Škoda Auto. What separates the Škoda story from other privatization experiences 
is that the government successfully identified the best new owner that could turn Škoda into a 
globally competitive firm. It also sought reciprocity for absorbing Škoda’s debts in the form of 
pledges to invest in Škoda, target outputs for production and promises to work with the Czech 
supplier industry. The government did not simply privatize by selling to any private owner 
without restrictions, rather it found the optimal private partner for Škoda and put restrictions on 
the agreement which allowed the government to monitor the development of the firm for the first 
few years after the sale. These policies were rewarded with the rebirth of Škoda as a global 
competitor. Since its privatization in 1991, Škoda has grown from producing 180,000 cars before 
privatization to nearly 550,000 cars in 2006 and from 20,000 employees to 23,000 over the same 
period (www.czech.cz, 2006). The company is currently responsible for 7.7% of the country’s 
exports (Yahoo News, 2006). 
The government’s assistance through its economic development agency, CzechInvest, 
has also been crucial in spreading the benefits of foreign investment and a free market beyond 
one major firm to the whole industry. CzechInvest provides important services which address 
issues such as foreign investment, technological capability, and education, all of which are 
important to ensuring the competitiveness of this key industry. 
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III. Privatization Success Story: Škoda Auto 
As noted above, privatization has helped to produce economic growth and development, 
but only in some cases and less often in developing countries. Škoda, however, is a 
counterexample of a successful privatization story that took place in a developing country. In this 
section, I analyze what separated Škoda from unsuccessful privatization attempts in other 
countries. 
A Valuable Asset 
In the Czech Republic, Škoda has had a long and proud history as an auto manufacturer. 
From its beginnings in 1895 as a bicycle manufacturer under the name of Laurent and Klement, 
the company went on to partner with Škoda Plzen, a large arms manufacturer, to mass produce 
automobiles. Škoda continued to operate through the Great Depression and Second World War. 
After the arrival of communism, Škoda’s access to Western parts and technology was cut off, but 
the company was still able to produce relatively reliable models which were noted for their 
longevity. Connections with the West were not completely severed as Škoda continued to 
compete in international racing events and export cars to Western Europe, most notably in 
Britain. Although Škoda was the butt of many jokes in the UK, the jokes served as evidence that 
enough people in Britain owned Škodas to make such jokes1. While Škodas were not the most 
reliable or attractive automobiles, they were able to maintain some market share thanks to the 
combination of their price point and durability. Many other models manufactured in the 
                                                 
1 One such joke goes as follows: 
 
Q: Why does a Škoda have a heated rear window? 
A: To keep your hands warm while you’re pushing it. 
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communist East such as Trabants (East German) or Ladas (Russian) were less common in the 
West. 
In the late 1980’s, the communist government of Czechoslovakia made a heavy push to 
upgrade Škoda’s production facilities in Mladá Boleslav. Huge investments were made in 
equipment and design to produce a new model designed by an Italian firm called the Favorit. By 
1990, Škoda actually had the most modern production facility in Europe (I. Němcová, personal 
interview, 2006). With these fixed assets in place and an existing market share in both the Czech 
Republic and some Western European markets, Škoda attracted heavy interest from Western 
firms when its privatization was announced. This heavy interest was a result of the government’s 
prior upgrading efforts and was critical for the future of Škoda. Škoda’s relatively robust 
production capacity and existing market share in the West improved the negotiating position of 
the Czech government and its ability to place conditions on the sale. Its smaller gap in 
competitiveness to the West also meant that it would not take as long for a purchaser to make 
Škoda a viable global firm. 
The Right Moves: Bidding and Sale of Škoda 
Once the communist government fell in 1989, many different reforms were undertaken 
by the new Czech government. One of the main changes was a push to transition to a free market 
economy. Pursuing the logic of neoliberal development theory, the Czech government decided to 
privatize its holdings in several major state companies, including Škoda. However, rather than 
simply soliciting bids and divesting Škoda to the highest bidder, the Czech government used an 
auction process to create competition between the bidders. The government used this 
competition to place conditions on the purchaser of Škoda, which helped to ensure that the new 
owner would be the best partner not only for Škoda, but for the entire Czech automotive industry. 
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In 1990, the state as sole owner of Skoda engaged in a bidding procedure with several 
foreign companies for the sale of Škoda. By the end of the year, two major contenders had 
emerged from twenty-four: Renault and Volkswagen (“VW”). According to the prime minister 
of the Czech Republic (then part of Czechoslovakia), Petr Pithart, the government was interested 
in "proposed technology investments," "impact on employment" and "willingness to respect the 
Škoda name brand" (New York Times, 1990).  
It is difficult to know the exact proposal made by Renault, but there were several factors 
reported in the press that separated the two bids. Most importantly, the proposed investment in 
Škoda from VW (roughly $5.3 billion) was reported to be much higher than that of Renault ($2.5 
billion) (New York Times, 1990). Both companies planned to maintain Škoda as an independent 
company, but Volkswagen was committed to produce higher-value models with the Škoda brand. 
Initial plans from Renault were to produce the low-end Renault 19 in tandem with the existing 
Škoda Favorit, to be joined by another low-end Renault model in the future (Financial Times, 
1990).  
After winning the bid in December 1990, Volkswagen purchased 31% of Škoda for $175 
million and invested $60 million to ensure Škoda’s solvency. It was to invest an additional DM 
$350 million by 1995 in order to raise its share of ownership to 71% of Škoda. Additionally, 
Volkswagen was supposed to spend another $3.5 billion on new Škoda facilities including a 
proposed engine plant and raise production to 400,000 cars by 1997. In return for this investment, 
the Czech government gave Volkswagen a two-year tax holiday, exempted VW from restitution 
claims on environmental liability (a major concern for Eastern Bloc firms), and assumed all of 
Škoda's existing debts (CTK Business News, 1993).  
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In the bidding process, the Czech government undertook three actions which were very 
important in the future development of Škoda and the Czech auto industry. First, it selected what 
it deemed to be the best company as the purchaser, not just the company that would generate the 
highest revenue for the government. Volkswagen was seen as a financially stronger and more 
dynamic company with bigger plans for higher-end models at Škoda. Renault would have paid 
more for the company up front by purchasing 40% rather than 31% of Škoda. This could have 
been more beneficial in the short term for an indebted government which was in need of funds, 
but the government chose to go with the purchaser who was the best partner for Škoda. 
In fact, Renault’s own state ownership, which could have been seen as a positive from the 
Czech government’s point of view, seems to have worked against it. Volkswagen was viewed by 
Czech decision makers as more dynamic and competitive and was a model that the government 
wanted to follow. According to Miroslav Zamečnik, spokesperson for the Czech finance minister, 
Volkswagen was “the leading European producer”, was “not state-owned, and in the eyes of 
many, it had better design" (New York Times, 1990, I. Němcová, personal interview, 2006). In 
tandem with choosing the more dynamic manufacturer, the Czech government also selected the 
company with bigger plans for Škoda. VW’s planned investment was more than twice the size 
proposed by Renault, and it planned to produce higher-end models, which allowed for the 
possibility of a better capital stock and skill base in the industry for the future.  
Second, the Czech government successfully negotiated with Volkswagen to accept a set 
of conditions which essentially effected a transition period for Škoda and its Czech suppliers. 
The government obtained promises from VW that Škoda would be operated as an independent 
subsidiary and develop its own vehicles and that VW would not lay off any of the existing 
workforce. Additionally, VW agreed that Škoda would retain its relationships with its Czech 
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suppliers and would not supplant them with VW’s global partners. These conditions were crucial 
in guaranteeing that the whole industry (i.e. both Škoda and Czech suppliers) had time to bridge 
the competitive gap that it faced and in ensuring that suppliers had a partnership with VW with 
which they could attract further investment from foreign partners. 
Finally, the government chose not to maintain long-term ownership of the company in 
order to direct its progress. On the contrary, it held the promise of future majority ownership in 
front of VW as a way to bring the company back to the negotiation table in the future. This 
proved to be very fortuitous. The government later used VW’s desire to obtain majority 
ownership to secure explicit guarantees on future investment when the company ran into trouble 
a few years after the deal. It would seem at first glance that the main advantage of the Renault 
bid was the possibility for the Czech government to maintain a majority stake in Škoda for the 
long term. Renault was seeking only a minority share of 40% with no specific plans to increase 
its stake in the future. However, this advantage would have been a disadvantage in the long run, 
because it is unlikely that the Czech government could have conducted any future renegotiation 
of the deal with Renault after the sale because Renault had no interest in acquiring any further 
shareholding in Škoda.  
Successful Navigation of Post Sale Difficulties 
The first problems between the new Škoda/VW and the government arose in 1993. In 
1992, the International Finance Commission (“IFC”) had announced the approval for a loan in 
the amount of $700 million to Škoda. Over 1993 and 1994, the proceeds of this loan were to be 
used by Škoda a.s. to fund the promised investments from Volkswagen that were made at the 
time of the sale. VW rejected the loan in September 1993 hours before it was to be signed, 
signaling its unwillingness to deliver on its investment promises (Financial Times, 1993). In the 
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contract that was signed by VW, the original $3.5 billion was not explicitly enumerated in the 
contract and was rather a “signal of intent” on the part of VW. Due to its own poor financial 
performance at that particular time, VW wanted to reduce the amount of its original proposed 
investment in Škoda (CTK Business News, 1993).  
The Czech government understood that in the face of losses that year, VW could not be 
expected to meet all of its original promises. Nevertheless, the government used its position as 
majority shareholder to force talks with the company and put pressure on VW to keep at least 
some of these promises. By the end of November 1993, the agreement between the government 
and Škoda was for an investment figure of $1.9 billion and that the engine plant would not be 
constructed as planned. In May 1994, the new CEO of VW Ferdinand Piech reiterated to the 
Czech finance minister, Vladimir Dlouhý, that VW would honor this reduced $1.9 billion 
investment. Dlouhý, somewhat skeptical, threatened that the Czech government would not allow 
VW to obtain a majority shareholding (as it was to do by 1995) if further adjustments were made 
in the investment plan (Finance East Europe, 1994). As a result of this pressure, when an 
agreement was signed in December 1994 which allowed VW to take the majority share in Škoda, 
the document included specific language which specifically confirmed the $1.9 billion 
investment in Skoda and set future production targets at 340,000 by 2000 (Financial Times, 
1994). This document made sure that the Czech government had a written commitment from 
VW for future investment in Škoda. 
  It is quite common that private firms secure benefits from governments such as land or 
tax breaks in exchange for promises on investment and job creation and that these promises are 
not filled (Amsden, 2001). Rather than focus on the fact that Volkswagen reneged on its 
promises, the Czech government used the opportunity to force VW to make firm its remaining 
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commitments, and it did so with the prospect of the future sale of the majority interest in Škoda. 
It is likely that the government would have had more difficulty in warding off future cuts in 
investment with an investor who already possessed what it desired. In the case of Renault, the 
Czech government could have vetoed Renault’s strategic decisions at Škoda because it would 
have been the majority shareholder, but it could not have forced the company to invest funds or 
new technology in Škoda. By holding on to what VW desired, the government was able to more 
effectively manage the company’s commitment to Škoda. In ensuring this commitment, the 
government ensured a significant level of investment in Škoda that would still upgrade its 
capabilities and technology, even if that level was not the same as was originally proposed at the 
time of sale.  
Privatization’s Effects on the Supplier Industry 
As noted at the outset, local supplier firms (often small and medium in size) are usually 
the first to go under after privatization and takeovers. In the case of Škoda, one of the most 
important pieces of the successful intervention taken by the government is the time period in 
which the intervention occurred in relation to trends in the automotive industry.  
Automotive suppliers have historically been faced with very high standards of quality. 
Czech component suppliers already had to make very large improvements in technology and 
quality at the time of Škoda’s sale compared to the situation under communism. In addition, the 
global parts supply industry was progressively becoming more demanding with original 
equipment manufacturers (“OEM”) forcing major cost concessions onto their supplier base. 
Many Western suppliers with modern production capabilities were unable to survive in this 
environment and were forced out of business. Specific to the Škoda case, VW was at the very 
forefront of the industry in the demands it placed on supplier capabilities and pricing. Because of 
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the convergence of these three themes, the condition of maintaining Czech suppliers for a 
determined period that the government obtained from VW was very important in the future 
development and growth of the Czech supplier industry. 
Beginning in the 1980’s, major automobile manufacturers began restructuring their 
relationships with suppliers by “tiering” their relationships (Figure One). The system consisted 
of three tiers of suppliers: Tier One, Tier Two and Tier Three.  Tier One suppliers were to 
provide whole systems (drivetrain, suspension, etc.) and were supposed to be the only company 
to maintain contact with the OEM. Tier Two suppliers focused on components, Tier Three on 
processes and Tier Four on materials.  
Through this structure, OEMs were able to force through cost savings onto Tier Ones. 
Tier One suppliers typically placed great value on their status throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s. 
They would often cede on pricing maintain their lead role. Additionally, suppliers were expected 
to be not just local but global partners supplying OEM assembly locations internationally. From 
1980 to the present, the supplier base shrunk from approximately 35,000 to about 8,000 due to 
these demanding conditions (Korth, 2006). 
The tiering and restructuring of the supplier base was particularly pronounced in Europe. 
Because the European automotive industry has historically been characterized by overproduction 
and stagnant demand, OEMs there push very hard on the supplier base to obtain concessions on 
price. European production levels are often kept artificially high due to government ownership 
interests in manufacturers and political interests among labor unions. With such inflexibility in 
OEM assembly structure and capacity, European suppliers tend to feel the squeeze the most in 
cost-cutting measures.   
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This dynamic was also accelerated by the personalities of the era. In the 1990’s, some of 
those who had helped to restructure the supplier base were rewarded with higher management 
positions at the major manufacturers. In 1992, Jack Smith was rewarded for his success in 
increasing GM Europe’s profitability by being promoted to CEO of General Motors. At the time 
of his promotion, GM's international operations, predominantly represented by GM Europe, 
earned $2.1 billion, while General Motors as a whole lost $4.5 billion (USA Today, 1993). One 
of Smith’s key protégés was Jose Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua. Lopez de Arriortua had been 
largely responsible for GM Europe’s positive performance by extracting savings from GM’s 
European suppliers, and he followed Smith to become head of GM’s global purchasing division. 
Lopez de Arriortua’s ideas with regards to suppliers did not simply involve cost-cutting. 
He envisioned a complete transformation of the supplier role into “modular production”, where 
suppliers would complete most of the assembly at a plant and only a handful of the 
manufacturer’s employees would be present. Lopez de Arriortua envisioned the construction of 
such a facility in his Basque homeland, but in the economic climate of the early 90’s, GM chose 
not to move forward with its construction. In 1993, he moved from GM to VW as head of 
worldwide production under a five-year, $20 million contract. The motivation behind this move 
was his desire to see a new, modular system implemented in automotive production through the 
construction of his dream facility in Spain, and it was speculated that VW may have agreed to 
construct such a facility (New York Times, 1993).  
To illustrate the nature of this new role for suppliers, it is helpful to examine the structure 
of the VW facility that was built in Resende, Brazil in Rio de Janeiro state as it has been the 
subject of academic research. Built in 1996, it was constructed at the same time and under the 
same philosophy of Mr. Lopez de Arriortua as the new Škoda facilities in the Czech Republic. At 
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the Resende facility, 1,500 workers were employed at the plant. Of that, 1,300 were employed by 
eight subcontractors located inside the facility. Each supplier was required to obtain parts and 
materials, as well as assemble or install the parts on the vehicle or chassis. This was in direct 
contrast to all previous auto assembly techniques where suppliers were only responsible for the 
delivery of parts and systems to the OEM assembler. The role of VW in the plant was mainly to 
monitor flow and quality of assembly inside the facility in order to ensure reliability of the final 
product. VW’s payment to its suppliers was based on the sale of product and not on delivery of 
parts, meaning that much of the inventory for assembly was being financed by the supplier 
(Abreu, Beynon, Ramalho, 2000). This factory is very similar to the new plants that Škoda 
constructed in Mladá Boleslav for the new Škoda models during the mid-90’s, and Czech 
suppliers had to be able to take on these new and demanding roles inside the factory (I. Němcová, 
personal interview, 2006). 
In sum, the competitive gap that faced the automotive supplier industry in the Czech 
Republic after the sale of Škoda was compounded by industry dynamics as well as dynamics 
specific to VW ownership. Thus, bridging the gap was a very daunting task. Not only did Czech 
suppliers have to meet the much higher requirements for quality that all Western OEMs required, 
they also had to assume pioneering roles inside the factory itself, while still being able to deliver 
on time at prices that many established Western parts suppliers had difficulty achieving because 
of VW management. All of this had to be performed in order to survive in the industry. 
Therefore, it would seem to be even more crucial that the government required VW to 
work with Škoda’s existing supplier base at the outset of its new private ownership. VW would 
much rather have replaced Czech firms with VW global partners and could easily have sourced 
many of its components from Germany. Mladá Boleslav, which is where most Škodas are 
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manufactured, is less than 30 miles from the German border at the closest point. But because of 
the conditions that the government placed on Škoda’s privatization, VW was forced to try and 
find foreign partners for Czech suppliers so as to upgrade their capabilities as quickly as possible. 
The promise of guaranteed VW/Škoda business also proved a strong magnet for foreign 
investors. Czech suppliers certainly needed this foreign investment because it upgraded their 
processes as well as provided access to a wider customer base through the foreign investor, 
enabling the Czech subsidiary to grow and diversify away from Škoda business. The current 
ownership of Czech suppliers reflects this importance of FDI. Figure Two exhibits this dynamic 
through a selected sample from 2000 of twenty major Czech automotive suppliers. Of these 
twenty firms, only eight have majority domestic capital (Pavlinek, 2002).   
In the years immediately after the sale of Škoda, three major global suppliers (Ford, 
Rockwell and TRW) bought Czech component suppliers with major Škoda business. Since then, 
TRW’s subsidiary TAE Benesov has grown from 150 employees to over 600, and Rockwell’s 
(now ArvinMeritor) subsidiary in Liberec has grown from 400 to over 500 employees and tripled 
sales from $150 million to $450 million over the period from 1994-1997. 
Unsuccessful Privatization in the Czech Republic: Tatra Kopřivnice 
The appropriateness of the privatization strategy followed by the government in the 
Škoda case can be reinforced not only through less positive experiences from abroad, but also 
from other failed privatizations in the Czech Republic itself. It is important to examine the 
differences between the Škoda privatization and other less successful privatization experiences to 
determine the key elements of what made the Škoda story successful. 
Tatra Kopřivnice (“Tatra”) was a well known maker of trucks in the former 
Czechoslovakia. It produced about 15,000 trucks annually and employed 16,000 people during 
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communism. More than half of this production was sold into other COMECON countries, with 
about 5,000 exported to the Soviet Union annually (Pavlinek, 2000). Tatra’s sales and marketing 
operations were handled by the state foreign trade company. After 1989, Tatra faced major 
competitive difficulties with the new free market structure. Very little was done internally to 
restructure the company or make it more competitive before its privatization in the expectation 
that the new owners would fix the company. Due to its poor competitive situation, the only offers 
which Tatra received from foreign investors were unacceptable to its management. Both 
Mercedes and Fiat’s Iveco approached Tatra about a sale, but were unwilling to maintain the 
Tatra brand. Failing acceptable interest from foreign investors, the government exerted direct 
influence on management to use voucher privatization so that the government would have a 
famous name for this new privatization program. Tatra management was told that “voucher 
privatization was the safest way for them because new owners would not understand anything 
and nobody would interfere in their decision making” (Žák, 1997).  
Unfortunately, Tatra needed owners who knew what they were doing as well as 
investment capital beyond the just the purchase of the firm. Privatizing through vouchers did not 
provide a path to become more competitive in the market economy because the new owners were 
no better at running the company than the state. Production declined from 14,586 trucks in 1990 
to 1,358 in 1994. In response, the new Czech owners quickly enlisted three US managers to save 
Tatra in exchange for 15% of the shares (Pavlinek, 2002). Unfortunately, the existing 
management resisted the new management and would not allow the downsizing of the workforce. 
The US management could not find new markets for the existing products and was fired in 1994.  
Since 1994, Tatra has undergone three more ownership changes and has been in various 
stages of defaults on its debts and near bankruptcy. Recently, the situation has improved 
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somewhat. In 2006, the company recorded a small profit of $ 8 million on the sale of 1,226 units  
As of March 2007, the company is scheduled to be sold again by Terex Corporation of the 
United States, which has deemed Tatra a “non-core asset” (Czech Business Weekly, 2007). 
Two major mistakes were made by Tatra managers and the government in this case. The 
first was to not improve the company before approaching foreign investor about a sale. The 
second mistake was that when Tatra was privatized, the state and management picked completely 
inappropriate owners.  
Over the period from 1988 to 2000, Tatra trucks won the prestigious Paris-Dakar rally 
five times (Pavlinek, 2000), so perhaps Tatra management and the state were right to balk at 
becoming a simple assembly plant for a major Western manufacturer. But while Tatra had 
valuable technology, its marketing and financial situation were woeful. The state and 
management should have done something to correct these problems in order to widen the number 
of purchasers and create a strong negotiating position to place reciprocal conditions on the bids. 
Instead, the company became a propaganda tool for the voucher privatization project of the 
Klaus administration, which will be discussed in further detail in the next section. These new 
owners were inadequate for improving Tatra’s operations and the company suffered severely as a 
consequence. 
Voucher Privatization: The Wrong Kind of Private Ownership 
Beyond the individual sale of firms to suboptimal investors, the Czech government later 
made what could be considered more serious errors by favoring a specific type of privatization, 
voucher privatization, over other possible methods. In June 1992, the center-right Civic 
Democrats (ODS) won the parliamentary elections and Vaclav Klaus ascended to the position of 
prime minister. Klaus, a noted follower of neoliberal economists such as Friedman and Hayek, 
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was a major proponent of shock therapy and “getting the prices right”, which are very similar to 
some of the key components of the Washington Consensus.  
Klaus implemented policies which eschewed foreign capital in favor of his voucher 
privatization project. All Czech citizens were afforded the right to purchase a voucher booklet 
for a nominal fee and use the vouchers for the purchase of shares in formerly state-owned 
enterprises. Voucher privatization was intended to introduce widespread private ownership in 
Czech companies as well as to create a shareholder society, but instead was plagued with 
widespread corruption and graft. Major investment funds sprung up which offered to buy 
voucher booklets from citizens at a fraction of their worth. Citizens purchased booklets for the 
printing and distribution cost of 1,000 Czech crowns (Kč or Koruna česka), roughly $30 at that 
time, and were offered Kč 10,000 ($300) by investment funds to sell their booklets. Through this 
method, funds were able to acquire major shareholdings in Czech companies such as the brewing 
giant Pilsner Urquell or industrial manufacturer Škoda Plzen (Laurent and Klement’s original 
partner and the genesis of the Škoda Auto brand name) (I. Němcová, personal interview, 2006). 
 Fraud became widespread, of which one such example was “tunneling”. Lax regulations 
on cross-shareholdings in related companies allowed funds to acquire existing firms and set up 
shell companies through which profits were funneled out into personal bank accounts. A 
manufacturer would sell product at cost or below to the shell company, who would then sell 
product at market prices. Some firms were also greatly leveraged, providing further funds for 
crooked owners. When loans went into default, creditors found firms stripped of assets and cash 
which had been funneled away into managers’ hands. This kind of activity heavily damaged the 
reputation of the Czech Republic among foreign investors and is partly responsible for stunting 
Page 25 of 48 
 
the development of the Prague Stock Exchange and Czech capital market (I. Němcová, personal 
interview, 2006). 
Even when fraud did not take place, firms were hurt by lack of available foreign capital 
and technology. After Klaus and ODS took power, sales of Czech companies to interested 
foreign investors were severely curtailed and foreign direct investment was not heavily pursued. 
This occurred largely because the government under Klaus wished for the voucher privatization 
experiment to succeed.  
The policy had a very negative effect on Czech firms whose technology was outdated and 
needed investment in new equipment, particularly in the automotive industry. The Klaus 
government pushed voucher privatization to the exclusion of other alternatives. Some automotive 
manufacturers were actually recruited to participate in the voucher privatization scheme by the 
government. Several firms were not able to sell to foreign firms who had access to new 
technology, techniques and available capital. In one instance, the new government simply 
dropped a proposal to joint manufacture trucks with Mercedes to produce 75,000 trucks that had 
been approved by the prior government (Pavlinek, 2000). Also, Czech buyers were allowed to 
buy firms at their stated book value while foreign buyers had to submit a price proposal. Czech 
buyers also conducted audits of acquisition targets which sometimes deflated the book value. 
Thus, Czech firms were often forced to sell to a Czech owner who would leverage the company 
to make the purchase and then would not be able to invest in the necessary capital and 
technology to bring the firm up to international standards. According to the director of Temac 
a.s.,  
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“We had no illusions about Czech capital. We had this factory assessed by an 
international audit to find out its value. Then we told ourselves: if a Czech owner 
comes here, he will borrow X million [Czech crowns] from a bank. Then he will 
milk the factory and all profits will be used to service the loan. It will take ten to 
twenty years to pay the loan off and the factory will become outdated in the 
meantime. After twenty years, the factory could be closed and torn down … We 
wanted to privatize our company to save production here and to bring something 
for the people working in this region.” (Pavlinek, 2002) 
 
Some companies were almost bankrupted by the unavailability of foreign capital. In 
Figure Two, it is evident that many of the Czech suppliers which were initially privatized 
through the voucher privatization eventually sold out to foreign manufacturers in the end because 
they needed access to their technology, capital and customer base. 
In 1997, the economy contracted by 0.7% and unemployment rose year on year from 
4.8% to 6.5%. Under these pressures, Klaus was forced to resign, ODS was voted out of office 
and was replaced by the Social Democrats in 1998. The economy continued to shrink in 1998 by 
0.8% and unemployment continued to rise hitting a peak in 2000 at 8.8%. Only recently has the 
unemployment rate declined back around to 7% (Table One). Klaus was elected to the office of 
president in 2002 (replacing Vaclav Havel who was constitutionally ineligible due to two 
consecutive terms) where he continues to serve.  
The neoliberal theory to which Klaus and his cabinet subscribed espouses the value of 
private management of the economy and the exclusion of government interference in the market. 
The irony is, however, that the government interfered greatly in the privatization process to 
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conduct its voucher privatization experiment. Unfortunately, Klaus’ preferred version of private 
ownership was detrimental to the competitive position of many Czech companies at a crucial 
time in their development. In the worst case, it resulted in fraud which caused long-term damage 
to the image of the Czech Republic as a location to conduct business and stunted the 
development of its capital markets.  
The voucher privatization experience in the Czech Republic thus provides another 
example that there is not necessarily a direct causal relationship between privatization and 
economic development. While Škoda’s privatization counts as a success story, the specific 
method of privatization employed by the government was necessary to complement the 
efficiencies of private management. 
Results and Lessons from Škoda Sale 
The privatization of Škoda can largely be seen to be successful; Škoda is now partnered 
with a successful auto manufacturer, it produced 500,000 automobiles in 2006 and continues to 
employ approximately the same number of people (20,000) as it did in 1990. The automotive 
industry as a whole employs 130,000 people, accounts for 20% of manufacturing output and 
25% of all exports in the Czech Republic. Three major manufacturing plants are now located in 
the Czech Republic (Škoda, Toyota/Peugeot and Hyundai). The country has the second highest 
number of automobiles (855,000) produced in Eastern Europe and has the highest number of 
automobiles produced per capita in all of Europe (Table Two). This number is set to increase 
when the new Hyundai plant comes on line with forecasted production of 300,000 units annually. 
This successful case illustrates a key set of questions that need to be answered when undertaking 
privatization, and indeed many public actions in economic development. 
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After the fall of communism, the government chose to open the market to foreign goods 
because consumer welfare was greatly constrained by the restriction of choice in the marketplace. 
The government wished for domestic companies like Škoda to be competitive in this new 
domestic market as well as competitive globally. In this new market, Škoda had to improve its 
quality while increasing efficiency to stay profitable, and this transition required capital as well 
as new production techniques. 
Could privatization provide Škoda with the capital and techniques that it needed to 
become globally competitive? The answer was yes, but with conditions. The new owner had to 
have access to the resources Škoda needed (equipment, techniques and capital), and also the 
desire to provide them. A sale to a globally competitive foreign owner satisfied most of these 
conditions. Volkswagen had the capital, knowledge and the techniques, but it was unclear to 
what extent they had the desire to invest in Škoda. This requirement was resolved in two ways: 
first, through the explicit desire of VW to invest $3.5 billion in Škoda in its bid for the company, 
and second, through conditions placed on VW by the government to maintain and monitor that 
desire beyond the simple word of Volkswagen management. 
The goal of privatizing the auto industry went beyond the success of Škoda, however. 
The massive automotive supplier base needed to be upgraded as well. This task proved much 
more difficult than a simple privatization of each firm to appropriate purchasers. Without 
Škoda’s business, Czech suppliers would have been left with outdated production methods and 
no customers at a time when the industry was at its extreme in price competition and demands on 
suppliers’ capabilities. Under this scenario, it would have been difficult to find any investors for 
these firms at all, much less firms that would have fulfilled the criteria of having the resources 
and the desire to fully invest in the Czech company. With such potentially low demand, it also 
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would have been difficult to obtain any meaningful conditions of sale from an investor. Thus, the 
government wisely used the sale of its best and most-demanded asset, Škoda, to create better 
conditions for the privatization of the automotive suppliers. By obtaining a commitment from 
VW to work with existing Czech suppliers, the government effected two favorable outcomes 
which greatly increased the possibility of finding appropriate privatization partners. First, it 
ensured that the privatized firms would have a guaranteed customer that increased the value of 
the firm to potential purchasers. Second, the government restrictions guaranteed to purchasers of 
Czech suppliers that the customer with which they would have a guaranteed relationship was 
Volkswagen, at a time when VW was aggressively whittling down its supplier base into large 
relationships with key global partners. This greatly increased the demand for Czech suppliers and 
thus the likelihood that the government could find private partners who had the necessary 
resources and the desire to invest them in the supplier firms. 
On the other hand, it is the failure to answer adequately answer these questions that was 
the downfall of Tatra and the voucher privatization scheme. Companies were privatized with the 
intention of making them more economically competitive, but in fact were sold to owners which 
did not have the resources to ensure their survival in the new marketplace. Simply exchanging a 
public owner for a private owner did not address the lack of technology, skills and the funds that 
were needed to enable a privatized firm’s successful transition to the new market economy. 
Private Czech owners typically did not have access to the resources needed to upgrade privatized 
firms towards global competitiveness. Even if investment funds or Czech owners had some 
ability to access the needed resources, the question of their desire to do so was also not 
adequately addressed. Companies were privatized through vouchers into a society with an 
inadequate legal structure and many unsophisticated shareholders. The unfortunate fraud that 
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occurred, such as “tunneling”, is evidence of this lack of desire and the inappropriateness of 
voucher privatization for economic development and growth.  
IV. Challenges Beyond Privatization 
It is not simply enough to successfully navigate the privatization process in order to foster 
economic development. This is simply a beginning. Once a firm or industry has bridged the 
initial competitiveness gap, many obstacles stand in the way of growth and development of a 
firm in a global economy.  
Resources in a regional or national economy aggregate together to form an equation that 
creates a certain level of competitive advantage and value. In a simple formulation, infrastructure, 
the capital stock, the knowledge base and the cost of labor aggregate to create a value 
proposition for doing business in a country or region. This value is comparable across locations 
and is important in determining which types of economic activities in a nation can be globally 
competitive.  
Once the country opened back up to FDI in 1997, the Czech Republic combined 
moderate levels of infrastructure, knowledge and capital stock with a very low cost of labor to 
create a value proposition for doing business in the country. This value was relatively high, 
especially for the more labor intensive operations of foreign firms when compared to operating 
in their home countries or in other developing nations. Major investments in the Czech Republic 
initially were in the form of production facilities that used a high amount of labor. Examples of 
such investments are Škoda’s original assembly work in Mladá Boleslav as well as Matsushita 
and Philips’ major investments in television CRT assembly. However, the cost of labor portion 
of the Czech Republic’s economic value equation has been quickly eroding due to rising wages 
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and the increased competition from globalization. As globalization reduces risks and barriers 
associated with production in more and more countries, the array of value propositions among 
nations increases, and the Czech Republic’s advantage in labor costs diminishes when compared 
against a broader field of competing nations. Additionally, as the economy has grown over the 
last decade, so have wages, further reducing the cost savings in labor. Already several labor 
intensive assembly processes once located in the Czech Republic have moved out of the region; 
Škoda has moved some European assembly work to Poland and Philips has decided to build its 
new flat screen production facility in Poland as well. 
Therefore, the Czech Republic has been forced to increase the other pieces of its value 
equation to attract new firms and help existing firms grow. Infrastructure, capital stock and 
particularly labor skills (including management/entrepreneurial skills) must increase as the value 
provided by cheaper labor decreases over time in order to be economically competitive. 
Private firms exist only to maximize profits, not to increase capital, enhance skill sets, or 
raise wages. Often, investments in these areas are the byproducts of the firm’s attempt to 
maximize profits, but not always. Firms may choose only to invest in certain areas that help them 
directly or may not have the ability or resources to upgrade their competitiveness in certain areas. 
Thus, a need may still exist for another type of actor to provide certain types of resources and 
assistance in order to for local firms to grow and develop. If the free market process does not 
necessarily ensure the goal of increased competitiveness among local firms and labor, can public 
organizations play a significant role in furthering these objectives? 
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CzechInvest: Story of an Effective Public Actor 
The change in government in 1998 marked a significant change in government policies, 
particularly towards foreign direct investment. FDI was seen by the new government as a key 
element in promoting growth and development in the Czech Republic. It was through this shift 
that CzechInvest, a department of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, began its ascendance as 
the foremost economic development institution in the Czech Republic. 
Begun as a small marketing agency in 1993, CzechInvest (“CI”) has grown into a multi-
service organization which is the focal point for much of the Czech Republic’s economic 
development policy today. It has won awards from the European Investment Promotion Agency 
as IPA of the year for 2000 and 2001. This singles out CI as not only an exemplary agency 
among the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but also among the 
developed nations of Western Europe. 
At its inception in 1993, Jan Havelka was appointed manager of CzechInvest. During the 
rule of the conservative ODS party in the mid-1990’s, it was difficult for CI to prepare attractive 
services and incentives for foreign investors because the government favored voucher 
privatization. Despite the lack of political support, CI tried to create clear policies to attract FDI. 
According to the succeeding CEO of CzechInvest, Martin Jahn, this period of relative obscurity 
made CI work harder to “prove they (sic) were useful.” During this time, CI worked to develop 
its relationship with the EU. In the mid-90’s EU funds accounted for 60% of the funding of CI, 
and CI participated in the PHARE program which gave it access to the Irish Development 
Agency (World Bank, 2004). The similarities between the two nations were that they both had 
been European nations with a low level of labor skills and infrastructure as compared to their 
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neighbors. Ireland had recently undergone major economic growth and was able share some 
insight with its Czech partners.  
The initial cause for CI gaining in credibility and influence had a great deal to do with 
political maneuvering within the larger bureaucratic structure. Havelka was able to create a good 
working relationship with both the minister and deputy minister of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry as well as with the European Union and CI’s Steering Committee. The eleven-member 
Steering Committee was selected with the purpose of increasing CI’s networking capabilities; it 
included representatives from three separate government ministries and the Czech National Bank, 
as well as four private sector representatives. As the agency has grown, the importance and 
oversight of the Steering Committee has receded. 
A Unique Structure 
CzechInvest has the problem of both providing a market service and being a government 
agency; it is required to satisfy the business community’s needs and maneuver in bureaucratic 
and political circles. To a certain extent, it is a bit like a private business run by people with 
bureaucratic experience. Its customers are private firms, which require a quick response and 
effective products, and its shareholder is the Ministry of Trade and Investment. Through its 
actions and success, it has gained esteem and goodwill in government ministries, which has been 
important in helping it to negotiate bureaucratic procedures and obtain funds for its customers.  
In creating the company structure, Havelka focused heavily on keeping CI run like a 
business and worked with politicians to keep bureaucrats out of the organization. According to 
Havelka, “It is very important to keep an IPA business-like and not to be tempted to turn it into 
an administrative body due to the governmental nature.” His successor, Martin Jahn, confirms 
this philosophy. “We are a government agency trying to adopt a private sector management 
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style” (World Bank, 2004). This style of management has kept CI flexible in its product 
offerings and responsive to its customer’s needs. CI can only pay government salaries, so it has 
trouble recruiting experienced talent. It therefore hires talented college graduates who are 
motivated by the desire to get experience and gives them larger responsibilities than such 
graduates would get in a normal private sector job. 
At its inception, CI was very focused on attracting large greenfield FDI invesments such 
as major assembly facilities from foreign manufacturers. To this end, CI established foreign 
offices in key developed nations such as the United States and Germany as well as other nations, 
because CI found that it was too difficult to promote through the Czech embassies abroad. These 
foreign offices are scored on a unique point system which is meant to effectively direct the 
activities of the foreign office according to the larger goals of CI (Figure Three).  
Foreign promotion was initially very successful as CI landed several greenfield 
investments for new manufacturing facilities from major foreign investors such as Matsushita 
and Philips. However, as the global economy slowed at the millenium, CI’s focus shifted away 
from large FDI projects to attracting medium-sized businesses. More recently CI has included 
assistance to existing domestic firms across different industries.  
As its face to its customers, CzechInvest represents a “one stop” shop in terms of 
applying for public funds and government and regulatory approvals. The applicant company files 
with CzechInvest which subsequently navigates the regulatory procedures of the application 
through various agencies in the larger government. CI gives its business customers an estimation 
of how long it will take to complete its application at the outset of the process. 
Internally, CI is arranged into divisions which provide specific functions and interact 
with each other. The Department of Investment Development serves as the initial contact with 
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the applicant firm and locates “new leads” for investments. ID is approached by consultants 
when the Czech Republic has been shortlisted for a site location. Many times, the whole region 
(i.e. Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, etc.) has been shortlisted.  ID also targets specific firms as 
desired investors for the country and invites them to events. It profiles its customers and attempts 
to design products to fit their needs. Through the interaction with its customers, CI can identify 
areas of needed support for firms in the country. Its business-like operation encourages CI to 
market itself effectively to firms, and through customer feedback, it develops new ideas for 
assistance programs. CI compares these programs with other development agency models and 
creates a final product for firms. The performance of this product is subject to measurables and 
performance review (similar to the point scoring system for foreign offices), and it is revised as 
necessary (C. Černusca, personal interview, 2006).  
From ID, the customer is passed into project management and/or Investment Project 
Support, which acts as the face of CI to the client through the rest of the proceedings.  Starting in 
2007, CI will actually administer a portion of the EU structural funds that the Czech Republic 
receives, which will total somewhere between $3.5 to $6.5 billion over next six years. 
The success of the agency can be measured by more than its control of major investment 
funds. Since the change in government in 1998, CI has merged most of the other major 
development agencies of the country under its flag. CI has also administered 771 investment 
projects at a value of $18.5 billion creating over 153,000 new jobs (CzechInvest, 2006).  
How CzechInvest Helps Automotive Develop 
 CzechInvest has secured many foreign investments in the Czech automotive industry 
from both assemblers and suppliers. CI successfully landed the Toyota/Citroen plant in Kolin 
and the Hyundai plant in Nosovice, both of which will produce 300,000 vehicles per year. The 
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Toyota plant is actually the only plant in the parent company which uses almost all local content, 
which is a testament to the strength of the supplier base in the Czech Republic. Toyota’s exacting 
standards usually require them to use their Japanese suppliers. Overall, CzechInvest has 
mediated 170 investments in the automotive sector at a total of $8.1 billion creating over 53,000 
jobs. It has been involved with more investment and job creation in the automotive industry than 
any other industry in the country over its history (Figure Four). 
Starting with the change in government philosophy in 1998, the Czech Republic has been 
offering significant tax breaks and other financial incentives to attract FDI. The eligibility criteria 
will be changed in 2007, but in general it is aimed at providing long-term, high-value investment 
into the CR. These funds are available to automotive producers for the construction of a new 
plant or the expansion and modernization of an existing plant. Half of the investment must be 
covered by equity (ensuring the seriousness of the investment), at least 40% must be invested in 
machinery, and a minimum of 50% of that machinery must be high-tech. The investment cannot 
start before the application for incentives is made, new jobs and investment must be maintained 
over a period of eight years, and activities must be environmentally friendly. These restrictions 
aimed at providing more high-end investment seem to be working in CI’s estimation (C. 
Černusca, personal interview, 2006). These tax incentives are subject to regional restrictions as 
well. Priority areas have lower investment hurdles for tax relief, and the amount of relief that can 
be received is also higher for those regions (Figure Five). 
The current priority sectors for CI are auto, aerospace, high-tech engineering, micro- and 
consumer electronics, strategic services (mostly human intensive outsourcing, i.e. call centers 
and accounting), and ICT (information communication technologies) which is comprised mainly 
of software, telecom, and biotech/life sciences. Why were these industries targeted? The idea 
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was to target industries where FDI has been relatively low, that are growth industries, and also 
have the potential to export. Once FDI starts to come “by itself”, the industry is less likely to be 
targeted. For example, CI had originally targeted plastics, but once it felt that FDI for plastics 
was arriving on its own, the industry moved off the list.  
From this point of view, it would seem curious that automotive would be included as a 
targeted industry, but it is higher-end automotive production, such as more technical auto parts 
and R&D projects, that CI is targeting. CI acknowledges that auto assembly is less value added, 
and that, over time, production will move to lower cost countries. It is therefore important for the 
Czech Republic to upgrade the existing industry before labor costs rise too quickly and 
production moves abroad. Higher value-added production is harder to outsource and is under less 
competition from unskilled, low-cost labor. 
To this end, CzechInvest provides assistance to suppliers of components (especially 
automotive suppliers) which are located in the country. It maintains a database of all suppliers in 
various industries and acts as a connection between a foreign company looking to source 
components from the country and its database of suppliers. An example is Electrolux, which 
contacted CI about acquiring a Czech supplier, which then in turn made the connection between 
the Czech company and Electrolux (C. Černusca, personal interview, 2006). 
 On a more intricate level, CI also has provided supplier development programs over the 
past five years in its initiative to upgrade the technological capacity of component companies in 
the Czech Republic. CI uses EU structural funds to run a program where Czech component 
suppliers can learn about existing and future standards in the industry such as the European 
Foundation for Quality Management (“EFQM”). Through its contacts with automotive 
manufacturers, CI can ascertain their requirements (both present and future), communicate them 
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to the Czech supplier base, and revert back to foreign manufacturers on which suppliers can 
provide the more technically demanding parts. This communication upgrades the Czech supplier 
base and encourages foreign manufacturers to locate more technical manufacturing processes in 
the Czech Republic. 
CI also runs a program called IQ Auto which is aimed at providing communication between 
the industry and technical universities. Investors and producers give information about their 
needs and requirements for employees, and CI tries to communicate that information to 
educational institutions so that they can adjust their study programs to provide more 
appropriately trained graduates. A big need for technical graduates exists among automotive 
firms, and there is growing enrollment in Czech technical universities. Of the some 300,000 
Czech university students, approximately 70,000 are in technical universities and about 8,000 
graduate annually. 
V. In Conclusion: The Pragmatic Path 
 In stepping back from the Czech automotive story, what lessons does it offer about the 
conditions under which economic liberalization and privatization can create economic 
development? In the aggregate, data can no doubt be used to show that private firms outperform 
state-owned firms. The most powerful and wealthy nations on earth embrace free markets and 
the largest and most successful firms are privately held. To stop here, however, ignores the 
crucial details of understanding the context in which the success of the free market takes place. 
Cases such as Škoda and CzechInvest show us that while free markets and private ownership 
may operate well in mature economies, institutions and pragmatic government policies play an 
important role in helping developing economies reach higher levels of development. Simply 
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applying black-box theory and expecting development to automatically emerge from the other 
end is a risky proposition. It is important to think critically in detail about where the economy is, 
where it is headed, and how its future can be shaped through pragmatic development policies. 
Hopefully, better descriptions of cases where this has happened will provide greater awareness 
and a clearer path towards more robust and locally rooted economic development (Rodrik, 1999). 
 The lesson for economic development planners and development agencies is to analyze in 
detail what competitive gaps exist in the local economy and assess what policy tools can be used 
appropriately to bridge these gaps. Privatization and foreign investment can provide solutions to 
bridging competitive gaps in the local economy, but development planners must specifically 
identify what kinds of investors will create the best environment for development and under what 
conditions. When working with private business or foreign investors, it is important for 
development planners to maximize the strength of their negotiating position and impose 
conditions that will help monitor desired development objectives. In addition, unmet needs for 
certain services related to investment or technological upgrading will exist in the market, and 
development agencies can effectively fill these needs if they are responsive, flexible and have 
good communication with local industry. As the free market mechanism serves to discipline poor 
management, development agencies can simultaneously make sure that local firms have the 
resources they need to succeed in the global economy. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Source: Korth, 2006 
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Figure 2 
Source: Pavlinek, 2002 
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Table 1 
Indicator 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
GDP -0.7 -0.8 1.3 3.6 2.5 1.9 3.6 4.2 6.1 6.8 
Unemployment 4.8 6.5 8.7 8.8 8.1 7.3 7.8 8.3 7.9 7.1 
Source: Czech National Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Country Population Cars Produced Production per 1k Inhabitants 
Czech Republic 10,200,000 855,000 83.8 
Slovakia 5,400,000 255,000 47.2 
Poland 38,600,000 580,000 15.0 
Russia 145,000,000 1,000,000 6.9 
Germany 83,000,000 5,300,000 63.9 
France 60,000,000 3,100,000 51.7 
Spain 40,000,000 2,000,000 50.0 
 Sources: Wikipedia.org, various news sources, www.autoindustry.co.uk 
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Figure 3 
Source: World Bank, 2004 
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Figure 4 
Source: CzechInvest 
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Figure 5 
Source: CzechInvest 
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